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Abstract
We extend the concept of two-level fingerprinting codes, introduced
by Anthapadmanabhan and Barg (2009) in context of traceability
(TA) codes [1], to other types of fingerprinting codes, namely iden-
tifiable parent property (IPP) codes, secure-frameproof (SFP) codes,
and frameproof (FP) codes. We define and propose the first explicit
non-trivial construction for two-level IPP, SFP and FP codes.
1 Introduction
Fingerprinting codes have been studied for more than 15 years due to their
applications in digital data copyright protection and their combinatorial in-
terest. In order to trace back to the source of pirate piece of digital data, the
data distributor hides a unique mark called a fingerprint in each legal copy.
The fingerprint can be viewed as a codeword length `, which each component
is picked from alphabet Q of cardinality q. Since all fingerprints are unique,
if a naive user tries to distribute his or her copy illegally, the fingerprint
will lead back to its owner right away. However, if a group of users form a
coalition and pool their copies together, it becomes a lot more complicated to
trace back to the coalition members. It is assumed that the coalition can only
produce data fingerprinted by words such that each component agrees with
at least one of the codewords in the coalition: an element of the descendant
set of the codewords.We define descendant again clearly in the next section.
Once such a descendant is given, TA codes are designed to trace back at least
one member of the coalition, provided that the size of the coalition does not
exceed a certain parameter t. The user with the codeword that is most sim-
ilar to the given descendant, is guaranteed to be a member of the coalition.
However, there is no guarantee the tracing result is correct if the size of the
coalition is greater than t. The first attempt to gain more information about
the coalition when its size is bigger than t was by Anthapadmanabhan and
Barg (2009) in [1] who defined the concept of two-level fingerprinting codes;
from now on we refer to their codes as two-level traceability codes. In Antha-
padmanabhan and Barg’s setting, the users are divided into various groups;
for instance, by dividing the distribution area into several geographic regions,
and collecting users from the same region into one group. As in traditional
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(one-level) codes, when given an illegal copy produced by a coalition of users,
the codes can be used to identify one of the guilty users if the coalition size is
less than or equal to a certain threshold t. However, even when the coalition
is of a larger size T , where T > t, the decoder still provides partial informa-
tion by tracing one of the groups containing a guilty user. The group that
contains the codeword that is closest to the illegal copy must contain at least
one member of the coalition. However, they provide no explicit construction
of two-level traceability codes apart from using random codes when t = 1 or
t = 2.
IPP, SFP and FP codes have been widely studied as replacements for,
or weakenings of, TA codes [5, 10]. In this paper, we aim to explore TA,
IPP, SFP and FP codes in the two-level context. Although TA codes have
a very efficient algorithm for traitor tracing and very interesting in terms of
applications, there is no explicit construction for two-level traceability codes
available, except in the trivial case. IPP codes can replace TA codes, since
they also have tracing ability when a coalition under a threshold t. Moreover,
under the same parameters, such as length and alphabet size, IPP codes are
much bigger. Therefore, it is important to study two-level IPP codes. We
also study SFP and FP codes, which focus on preventing innocent users
from being framed, and analyze their interesting combinatorial properties.
We define each type of codes properly in the next section. Our main result
(Theorems 4, 5, and 6) is a construction for two-level IPP, SFP and FP
codes when the number of the groups is small, i.e. less than or equal to the
alphabet size. This is actually the first explicit non-trivial constructions for
two-level fingerprinting codes.
More details on fingerprinting codes’ applications and combinatorial prop-
erties can be found in a survey by Blackburn [3]. We also suggest reading
these prior works for more in-depth details: see [6] and [7] for the concept of
traitor tracing along with traceability; see [4], [9], and [11] for further com-
binatorial properties of TA codes; more details about FP and SFP codes are
available in [5] and [10], respectively.
The different types of codes are defined in Section 2 and the relationships
between the definitions are explored. In Section 3, we provide our proposed
construction for two-level codes. Section 4 is a short conclusion containing
open problems.
2 Definitions and Relationships
In this section, we restate the definitions of the classical one-level codes we
are interested in, then define the corresponding two-level codes.
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2.1 One-Level Codes
Before giving the codes’ definitions, it is necessary to introduce some nota-
tion. Let C be a code of length ` on an alphabet Q of (finite) size q. Then,
we issue data with a hidden different fingerprint from C to each user. The
elements of C are called codewords. The hamming distance between code-
words x, y will be written as dH(x, y). For any X ⊆ Q` and y ∈ Q`, let d(X)
denote the minimum distance of X and let dH(X, y) = min
x∈X
dH(x, y).
We call any subset C ⊆ Q`, a q-ary length ` code. For each x ∈ Q`,
we write xi for the ith component of x. For X ⊆ Q`, we define the set of
descendants of X to be the subset desc(X) ⊆ Q` given by
desc(X) = {d ∈ Q` : ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., `}, ∃x ∈ X such that di = xi}.
For example, let P = {1100, 2102, 1122}, then
desc(P ) = {1100, 1102, 1120, 1122, 2100, 2102, 2120, 2122}.
Let t be a positive integer. For a code C define the t-descendant code of C,
denoted desct(C), by
desct(C) =
⋃
X⊆C
|X|≤t
desc(X).
Definition 1. Let C be an q-ary length ` code and let t be a positive integer.
(i) C has the t-frameproof property (or is t-FP) if for all X ⊆ C such that
|X| ≤ t, it holds that
desc(X) ∩ C ⊆ X
(ii) C has the t-secure-frameproof property (or is t-SFP) if for all X0, X1 ⊆
C of size at most t, if desc(X0) ∩ desc(X1) 6= ∅, then X0 ∩X1 6= ∅.
(iii) C has the t-identifiable parent property (or is t-IPP) if for all x ∈
desct(C), it holds that ⋂
X⊆C:|X|≤t
x∈desc(X)
X 6= ∅.
(iv) C has the t-traceability property (or is t-TA) if for all X ⊆ C that
|X| ≤ t and for all x ∈ desc(X), for all z ∈ C with dH(x, z) minimal,
z ∈ X.
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Presuming that the coalition size is at most t. None of the coalition
under FP codes can produce a codeword that is not belong to the coalition.
In SFP codes, the descendant sets of codewords from two disjoint coalitions
are always disjoints. All the coalition of IPP codes that can produce the
same words, own at least one codeword in common. Lastly, in TA codes,
given a descendant of any coalition under TA code, a codeword that is most
similar to the given descendant, is always a member of the coalition.
It is not difficult to check from the definitions that the relationships among
different types of codes are as follows; t-TA codes are t-IPP codes, t-IPP codes
are t-SFP codes and t-SFP codes are t-FP codes.
2.2 Two-Level Codes
In this section, we extend the concept of two-level fingerprinting codes, in-
troduced by Anthapadmanabhan and Barg (2009) in context of traceability
(TA) codes [1], to IPP, SFP and FP codes. Then, we present an overview of
relationships between different types of fingerprinting codes.
The motivation behind the definitions of two-level fingerprinting codes is
to gain more information from a word produced by a coalition that is big-
ger than the first threshold t. Consider the following scenario. The content
distributor distributes the same number of distinct digital copies to each
company. Then those companies assign each copy in their hands to an in-
dividual employer. Here each company is acting as a group in our two-level
model. Once a piracy has occurred, apart from tracing back to an individual
traitor or protecting an innocent user from being framed as can be achieved
by one-level codes, one might be interested in just tracing back to a company
that employs one of the coalition members and sue the whole company (two-
level TA and two-level IPP), or to make sure that none of those companies
can cooperate and frame the other innocent companies without getting one
of their employee involved (two-level SFP and two-level FP).
In traditional one-level codes, we assign a different fingerprint from C to
each user. Here C is a code of length ` over an alphabet Q of (finite) size
q. In two-level codes, we partition a one-level code C into g disjoint sets of
p elements each, denoted by C1, C2, ...Cg. Then we call C a q-ary length `
two-level code, containing g groups of size p. Hence, C = C1 ∪ C2 ∪ ... ∪ Cg,
we have |Ci| = p for all i, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., g}, and Ci ∩Cj = ∅ when i 6= j. For a
codeword c ∈ Ci, let G(c) represent its group index i.
Definition 2. Let C = C1 ∪ C2 ∪ ... ∪ Cg be a two-level q-ary length ` code
and let T, t be positive integers where T ≥ t.
(i) C has the (T, t)-frameproof property (or is (T, t)-FP) if
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(a) C is t-FP when viewed as a q-ary length ` code, and
(b) for all X ⊂ C such that |X| ≤ T and for all x ∈ desc(X) ∩ C,
G(x) ∈ G(X).
(ii) C has the (T, t)-secure-frameproof property (or is (T, t)-SFP) if
(a) C is t-SFP when viewed as a q-ary length ` code, and
(b) for all X0, X1 ⊆ C of size at most T , if desc(X0) ∩ desc(X1) 6= ∅,
then G(X0) ∩ G(X1) 6= ∅.
(iii) C has the (T, t)-identifiable parent property (or is (T, t)-IPP) if
(a) C is t-IPP when viewed as a q-ary length ` code, and
(b) for all x ∈ descT (C), ⋂
X⊆C:|X|≤T
x∈desc(X)
G(X) 6= ∅.
(iv) C has the (T, t)-traceability property (or is (T, t)-TA) if
(a) C is t-TA when viewed as a q-ary length ` code, and
(b) for all X ⊆ C that |X| ≤ T and for all x ∈ desc(X),
for all z ∈ C with dH(x, z) minimal (i.e. dH(x, z) = dH(C, x)),
G(z) ∈ G(X).
We refer to (T, t)-FP codes, (T, t)-SFP codes, (T, t)-IPP codes and (T, t)-TA
codes as two-level codes, and refer to all codes in Definition 1 as one-level
codes.
The relationships among different types of two-level codes and one-level
codes can be illustrated as in the following diagram.
T -TA =⇒ (T, t)-TA =⇒ t-TA
⇓ ⇓ ⇓
T -IPP =⇒ (T, t)-IPP =⇒ t-IPP
⇓ ⇓ ⇓
T -SFP =⇒ (T, t)-SFP =⇒ t-SFP
⇓ ⇓ ⇓
T -FP =⇒ (T, t)-FP =⇒ t-FP.
The proofs of the implications are straightforward from the codes’ defini-
tions. We state and prove the next theorem as an example.
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Theorem 1. A (T, t)-TA code is a (T, t)-IPP code.
Proof. Let C be a (T, t)-TA code. Accordingly, C is t-TA when viewed as a
one-level code. That is, C is a t-IPP code.
Let x ∈ descT (C) and let Dx be a set of all elements z in C that give the
minimum value of dH(z, x). Let U ⊆ C be any subset of size at most T such
that x ∈ desc(U). By the definition of two-level traceability code, we know
that for all z ∈ GDx, G(z) ∈ G(U). Hence G(Dx) ⊆ G(U). Then, we have
G(Dx) ⊆
⋂
X⊆C:|X|≤T
x∈desc(X)
G(X).
Consequently, ⋂
X⊆C:|X|≤T
x∈desc(X)
G(X) 6= ∅.
Therefore, C is a (T, t)-IPP code.
The proof of the rest of the relationships between the different type of
codes can be found in [8].
As a consequence of the definitions of codes, all two-level fingerprinting
codes possess the properties of one-level codes. So, it is natural to construct
two-level fingerprinting codes from existing one-level fingerprinting codes.
We propose our explicit construction in the next section.
3 Code Constructions
In this section, we aim to construct two-level fingerprinting codes from ex-
isting one-level fingerprinting codes. Our construction works provided the
number of groups is at most the alphabet size. Our construction begins with
a one-level code, removes some codewords, groups and modifies the remain-
ing codewords. The results are two-level codes with are guaranteed to be at
least half the size of their original codes.
Straight from the definitions, it is easy to see that the upper bounds on
the size of one-level codes are also relevant to two-level codes. In fact, rather
than using our construction, the following example is better for some special
cases. The construction here is simple and provides two-level codes that meet
the lower bounds of one-level codes.
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Example 1. Let ` be a positive integer greater than 2, and let Q a fi-
nite field of cardinality at least `. Let α1, α2, ..., α` be distinct elements of
Q. Consider the following t-FP code C = {(f(α1), f(α2), ..., f(α`) : f ∈
Q[X] and deg f < d`/te} (see [2]). Then, for any integer T > t, there ex-
ists a (T, t)-FP code C ′ of the same cardinality as C with q groups, where
q = |Q|.
Proof. Partition C into q groups, C1, C2, ..., Cq, by letting Ci = {x ∈ C :
x1 = i}. Since |C| = qd`/te and C ′ =
q⋃
i=1
C1, now we have a code C
′ = C
containing q groups of cardinality qd`/te−1. It is easy to see that none of the
codewords in C ′ can frame the codeword outside its own group, since any
pair of codewords from the different groups have different symbols in the first
co-ordinate. Together with t-FP property that C ′ inherits directly from C,
C ′ is a (T, t)-FP code of the same cardinality as C.
Example 1 has shown that there exist (T, t)-FP codes as big as (T, t)-FP
codes in some cases. In fact, for any t-IPP, t-SFP or t-FP code C, if there
exists an i ∈ {1, 2, ..., `} that only g ≤ q symbols from Q are used in the ith
co-ordinate and they are uniformly distributed, we can construct two-level
codes by partitioning its codewords into g groups according to the ith co-
ordinate, then obtain a two-level code C ′ with the same cardinality as C. We
exclude full proof from this paper: see [8] for details.
There are one-level codes that the distribution of alphabet symbols in any
co-ordinate is non-uniform (and there are examples that are the largest known
for some parameters) In this case, the above simple two-level construction
cannot be used. The construction we propose in the next subsection is general
enough to work in these cases, though at a cost of reducing the size of the
code by a factor of up to 2.
3.1 Main Theorem
In this section, we aim to construct two-level fingerprinting codes from ex-
isting one-level fingerprinting codes. Our construction works provided the
number of groups is at most the alphabet size. Our construction begins with
a one-level code, removes some codewords, groups and modifies the remain-
ing codewords. The results are two-level codes with are guaranteed to be at
least half the size of their original codes.
The next theorem is the core of our construction.
7
Theorem 2. Let q, g and ` be integers greater than 1, where g ≤ q. Let
C be an q-ary length ` code. Then there exists a q-ary length ` code C ′ of
cardinality at least |C|
2
, where C ′ possesses the following properties;
1. there exists an injection from C ′ to C with changes occur only in the
first co-ordinate of the codewords,
2. C ′ can be partitioned into g groups of the same size, each at least
⌈
|C|
2g
⌉
,
3. the first co-ordinate of codewords in each group of C ′ are distinct from
those of any other group.
The explicit construction of two-level codes is embedded in the proof
of Thorem 2. Before showing the detailed proof, we provide the following
example to give a rough idea about how to construct C ′ from a given code
C satisfying Theorem 2.
Example 2. Let n = 91, q = 11, g = 9 and p =
⌈
n
2g
⌉
= 6. Let g1, g2, ..., gq
be number of codewords of C beginning with each symbol. Suppose we have:
g1 = 4 g2 = 5 g3 = 10 g4 = 11
g5 = 17 g6 = 5 g7 = 2 g8 = 4
g9 = 18 g10 = 10 g11 = 5.
Our aim is to form new 9 groups of size 6, where the first co-ordinate of
codewords in each new group are distinct from any other groups. Our method
can be divided in to 3 main steps: splitting, amalgamating and replacing.
We illustrate the construction of C ′ in Figure 1.
Step 1: Splitting
The purpose of this step is to split all big groups, which contain p codewords
or more, into one or more smaller groups of size at least p. Observe that
g3, g4 and g10 provide 1 group each, while g5 and g9 give 2 and 3 groups,
respectively. We now have 8 groups with only 5 different first co-ordinates.
Remove any 3 other groups to obtain 3 more first co-ordinates, let them be
g2, g6 and g11. Hence, 2, 6 and 11 have become unused first co-ordinates.
Step 2: Amalgamating
In this step, we aim to create more groups, of size at least p, by merging at
least 2 smaller groups together. So, we merge the remaining groups together
to obtain the last group of size g1 + g7 + g8 = 10.
Step 3: Replacing
Since some first co-ordinates of the groups we have constructed are repeated,
we replace them with those unused first co-ordinates in this step. Then,
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reduce the number of codewords in each group to p. Here the repeated first
co-ordinates are 5 and 9, replace the first co-ordinate of codewords in those
”repeated” groups (1 group from g5 and 2 groups from g9) by the unused
first co-ordinates; 2, 6, 11.
The result after completing these 3 steps and removing any extra elements
is 9 disjoint groups of size 6, where the first co-ordinate of codewords in each
group are distinct from any other groups. The following table illustrates
what we did earlier. We abuse the notation and use ki for the ith codeword
in group t, i.e. the ith codeword beginning with symbol t.
Now, we prove Theorem 2 using the similar approach as in Example 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let q and ` be integers greater than 1. Let C be a
one-level code length ` over an alphabet Q, where |Q| = q. Let g be a
positive integer less than or equal to q. Denote
⌈
|C|
2g
⌉
by p. For each symbol
a ∈ Q, let Ga = {x ∈ C : x1 = a} and denote the size of Ga by ga. And
let ga = αap + βa, where αa, βa are integers and 0 ≤ βa < p. Let Q1 be
{a ∈ Q : αa > 0}, q1 = |Q1| and v =
∑
a∈Q
αa =
∑
a∈Q1
αa. We are now trying to
construct g groups of p codewords which the first co-ordinate of each group
is different from the others. As in Example 2, we proceed through the three
main steps: splitting, amalgamating and replacing.
Step 1: Splitting
Now, for each a in Q1, we pick αap codewords from each Ga, then divide these
codewords into αa sets of p codewords. At this stage, we obtain v disjoint
sets of p codewords, namely C1, C2, ..., Cv, with the property that all the
codewords within the same set have the same symbol in the first co-ordinate.
However, some of the symbols are still being used by more than one group.
If v ≥ g we are done: for i ∈ {1, 2, ..., g}, we replace the first co-ordinate
of the codewords in Ci by symbol i to form subset C
′
i, and define C
′ =
g⋃
i=1
C ′i.
So without loss of generality, we assume v < g. To construct the first v
groups from C1, C2, ..., Cv, we need v different symbols to replace the first
co-ordinate of each group. Besides the q1 symbols in Q1, we need v−q1 extra
symbols. Let Q2 be any subset of Q of cardinality v containing Q1. Throw
away all codewords in Ga where a ∈ Q1\Q2.
Step 2: Amalgamating
We merge some of the remaining Ga, where a ∈ Q\Q1, into g − v groups
of size between p and 2p − 2, where the first co-ordinates of each group are
different from the other groups. This can be done as follows.
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Figure 1: Groups Dividing in Example 2
10
Consider ∑
a∈Q\Q2
ga = |C| −
∑
a∈Q2
ga
= |C| −
∑
a∈Q2
(αap+ βa)
= |C| −
(∑
a∈Q1
αap+
∑
a∈Q2
βa
)
≥ |C| − (vp+ v(p− 1))
≥ 2gp− vp− v(p− 1)
= 2(g − v)p+ v.
Hence, apart from ∪a∈Q2Ga, we have at least 2(g − v)p + v > 2(g − v)p
codewords left in the system. And, since ga = αa + βa = 0 + βa = βa ≤ p− 1
for all a ∈ Q\Q2, we can group ga, a ∈ Q\Q2 in a greedy fashion into g − v
sets of size between p and 2p− 2, where each a ∈ Q\Q2 is allowed to merge
into at most one set. Name the sets Cv+1, CS+2..., Cg. Observe that the first
co-ordinate of codewords in each set varies, but differs from any other groups.
Step 3: Replacing
Here we construct the groups of C ′ as follows: Let Q2 = {a1, a2, ..., ag}.
1. for i = 1 to v, let C ′i be a set of codewords obtained from Ci by replacing
the first co-ordinate by the symbol ai ∈ Q2,
2. for i = v + 1 to g, let C ′i be a set of any p codewords from Ci,
3. let C ′ =
g⋃
i=1
C ′i.
Now, we need to show that our constructed code C ′ satisfies Theorem 2.
Let the mapping ϕ : C ′ −→ C map each codeword of C ′ to its corre-
sponding codeword in C. It is not difficult to see that ϕ is an injection that
makes changes in only the first co-ordinate of any codeword.
Hence, we are now obtain a code C ′ contains g groups of the same size,
each at least
⌈
|C|
2g
⌉
with the property that the first co-ordinate of codewords
in each group are distinct from any other groups, and an injection ϕ from C ′
to C with changes occur only in the first co-ordinate of the codewords.
Note that to construct C ′, we have eliminated
(∑
a∈Q
βa
)
− (g − v)p
codewords from C. Here the first term represents all the remainders, and
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the second term is derived form (g − v) amalgamated groups that were
taken back from the thrown away remainders. Now
(∑
a∈Q
βa
)
− (g − v)p =
(|C| − vp) − (g − v)p = |C| − gp ≤ |C| − |C|
2
= |C|
2
. Hence we eliminate at
most |C|
2
codewords from |C|.
For any one-level FP, SFP and IPP code, the two-level code satisfying
Theorem 2 has the corresponding two-level fingerprinting property. To make
it more convenient for us to show this in the next subsection, we define some
mappings and a lemma we need here.
Let the mapping pi : Q −→ Q be defined as follows. Let pi(a) = a when
a does not appear as the first co-ordinate of any codeword of C ′: otherwise
let pi(a) = b ∈ Q when there exists a codeword c′ ∈ C ′ with c′1 = a that was
derived from c ∈ C with c1 = b.
Let the mapping ψ : Q` −→ Q` be defined by mapping x ∈ Q` to ψ(x) ∈
Q` where
ψ(x)i =
{
pi(xi) if i = 1;
xi otherwise.
It is not difficult to see that ψ is a well-defined function and ϕ from Theorem 2
is actually ψ when restricted to C ′, i.e. ϕ = ψ|C′ .
Observe that for any i ∈ {1, 2, ..., `} and any codewords y, z ∈ C ′, if
yi = zi, then ϕ(y)i = ϕ(z)i. Moreover, ϕ(y)i = yi = zi = ϕ(z)i when i 6= 1.
Lemma 3. Let C and C ′ be codes length ` over Q satisfying Theorem 2. Let
X be a subset of C ′. Then
ψ(desc(X)) ⊆ desc(ψ(X)).
Proof. Let X be a subset of C ′ and let y be a codeword in ψ(desc(X)).
Then, there exists a codeword x in desc(X) such that ψ(x) = y. For any
component i in {1, 2, ..., `}, there exists a codeword xi in X, where xi =
xii . Hence ψ(x)i = ψ(x
i)i for all i ∈ {1, 2, ..., `}. Which implies ψ(x) ∈
desc({ψ(x1), ψ(x2), ..., ψ(x`)}) ⊆ desc(ψ(X)). Therefore y ∈ desc(ψ(X)),
which implies ψ(desc(X)) ⊆ desc(ψ(X)).
3.2 Existence of Codes
Here we demonstrate that the codes C ′ satisfying Theorem 2 are two-level
FP, SFP or IPP code if the original codes C are respecting FP, SFP or
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IPP codes. Also, we provide an example showing that the two-level code
constructed from a TA code using Theorem 2 does not always possess two-
level TA property.
Theorem 4. Let t, q, g and ` be integers greater than 1, where g ≤ q. And
let T be any integer greater than t. Suppose there exists a q-ary length `
one-level t-FP code C. Then there exists a q-ary length ` two-level (T, t)-FP
code C ′ of cardinality at least |C|
2
, where C ′ contains g groups of the same
size.
Proof. Let C ′ be a code obtained from the t-FP code C as in Theorem 2.
It is easy to see that none of the codewords in C ′ can frame the codeword
outside its own group, since any pair of codewords from the different groups
have different symbols in the first co-ordinate. So, only t-FP property of C ′
needs to be proved.
Let U be any subset of C ′ containing at most t codewords. Let x ∈
desc(U) ∩ C ′. We will show that x ∈ U . Since x ∈ desc(U) ∩ C ′, we have
ϕ(U) ⊆ C and |ϕ(U)| ≤ |U | ≤ t.
Since x ∈ desc(U) ∩ C ′, then x ∈ desc(U) and x ∈ C ′. By Lemma3,
ϕ(x) ∈ desc(ϕ(X)). Also it is easy to see that ϕ(C ′) ⊆ C, hence ϕ(x) ∈
desc(ϕ(X))∩C. This makes ϕ(x) ∈ ϕ(U) by the t-FP property of C. Hence
x ∈ U , which implies C ′ has t-FP property, i.e. C ′ is a (T, t)-FP code.
Then we can conclude that there exists a q-ary length ` two-level (T, t)-
FP code C ′ of size at least |C|
2
, containing g groups (each of size at least⌈
|C|
2g
⌉
).
Theorem 5. Let t, q, g and ` be integers greater than 1, where g ≤ q. And
let T be any integer greater than t. Suppose there exists a q-ary length ` one-
level t-SFP code C. Then there exists a q-ary length ` two-level (T, t)-SFP
code C ′ of cardinality at least |C|
2
, where C ′ contains g groups of the same
size.
Proof. Let C ′ be a code obtained from the t-SFP code C as in Theorem 2.
1. LetX1, X2 be subsets of C of size at most t, where desc(X1)∩desc(X2) 6=
∅. We will show that X1 ∩X2 6= ∅.
Let x ∈ desc(X0) ∩ desc(X1). Then ϕ(x) = ψ(x) ∈ ψ(desc(X0) ∩
desc(X1)). Now
ϕ(x) ∈ ψ(desc(X1) ∩ desc(X2))
⊆ ψ(desc(X1)) ∩ ψ(desc(X2))
⊆ desc(ψ(X1)) ∩ desc(ψ(X2)) by Lemma 3
= desc(ϕ(X1)) ∩ desc(ϕ(X2)).
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Therefore desc(ϕ(X1)) ∩ desc(ϕ(X2)) 6= ∅. By the t-SFP property
of C, we deduce that ϕ(X1) ∩ ϕ(X2) 6= ∅. Since ϕ is an injection,
ϕ(X1) ∩ ϕ(X2) = ϕ(X1 ∩ X2). Therefore X1 ∩ X2 6= ∅, which implies
C ′ has the t-SFP property.
2. Let Y1, Y2 be subsets of C of size at most T , where desc(Y1)∩desc(Y2) 6=
∅. We will show that G(Y0) ∩ G(Y1) 6= ∅.
Let x ∈ desc(Y1) ∩ desc(Y2). Then there exist codewords a in Y1 and b
in Y2, where a1 = x1 = b1. Since the first co-ordinate of each group is
different from the others, we can conclude that G(a) = G(b). Therefore
G(a) ∈ G(Y1) ∩ G(Y2) 6= ∅, so C ′ is a (T, t)-SFP code.
Theorem 6. Let t, q, g and ` be integers greater than 1, where g ≤ q. And
let T be any integer greater than t. Suppose there exists a q-ary length ` one-
level t-IPP code C. Then there exists a q-ary length ` two-level (T, t)-IPP
code C ′ of cardinality at least |C|
2
, where C ′ contains g groups of the same
size.
Proof. Let C ′ be a code obtained from the t-IPP code C as in Theorem 2.
1. Let x ∈ desct(C ′). Then, there exists U ⊆ C ′ such that |U | ≤ t and
x ∈ desc(U). By Lemma 3, we know that ψ(x) ∈ desc(ϕ(U)) and
ϕ(U) ⊆ C. Observe that |ϕ(U)| ≤ |U | ≤ t. Hence ψ(x) ∈ desct(C).
Since C is an IPP code, ⋂
X⊆C:|X|≤t
ψ(x)∈desc(X)
X 6= ∅.
Also, for any X ⊆ C ′, x ∈ desc(X) implies ψ(x) ∈ desc(ϕ(X)) and
|X| = |ϕ(X)|. Hence ⋂
X⊆C:|X|≤t
ψ(x)∈desc(X)
X ⊆
⋂
X⊆C′:|X|≤t
x∈desc(X)
ϕ(X).
Since ϕ is injective, we have⋂
X⊆C′:|X|≤t
x∈desc(X)
ϕ(X) = ϕ(
⋂
X⊆C′:|X|≤t
x∈desc(X)
X).
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Hence
ϕ(
⋂
X⊆C′:|X|≤t
x∈desc(X)
X) 6= ∅.
Therefore ⋂
X⊆C′:|X|≤t
x∈desc(X)
X 6= ∅,
which shows that C ′ is a t-IPP code.
2. Let y ∈ descT (C ′). Then, there exists V ⊆ C ′ such that |V | ≤ T and
y ∈ desc(V ). Let v be a codeword in V such that v1 = y1, and let
i ∈ {1, 2, ..., g} such that v ∈ C ′i. Hence G(v) = i. For any X ⊆ C ′
of cardinality at most T with desc(X) containing y, there exists a
codeword yX such that y1 = y
X
1 . Since the group index of a codeword
can be determined from its first co-ordinate, we have G(yX) = i. That
implies
i ∈
⋂
X⊆C′:|X|≤T
y∈desc(X)
G(X).
Consequently, ⋂
X⊆C′:|X|≤T
y∈desc(X)
G(X) 6= ∅.
Therefore, C ′ is a (T, t)-IPP code.
The two-level codes satisfying Theorem 2 preserve the fingerprinting prop-
erty from their corresponding one-level codes for IPP, SFP and FP codes.
However, this is not always true in the case of TA codes as can be seen in
the following example.
Example 3. Let C = {011, 022, 033, 044, 105, 206, 307, 408, 550, 660, 770, 880} ⊆
{0, 1, 2, ..., 8}3. It is not difficult to check that C is a 2-TA code. Let g = 4,
then p =
⌈
12
8
⌉
= 2. Then Theorem 2 does not guarantee two-level traceability
code from C.
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Proof. Here we have g1 = 4, g2 = g3 = ... = g8 = 1. Consider C1 =
{011, 022}, C2 = {033, 044}, C3 = {105, 550} and C4 = {206, 660}, which
leads to C ′1 = {011, 022}, C ′2 = {833, 844}, C ′3 = {105, 550} and C ′4 =
{206, 660} by Theorem 2. Let U = {011, 105, 550}, then 000 ∈ desc(U)
and G(U) = {1, 3}. Observe that 206 is a codeword of C ′ with dH(000, 206)
minimal, but G(206) = 4 6∈ G(U). Therefore C ′ is not a (K, 2)-TA code for
any integer T greater than 2.
4 Conclusion and Open problems
Theorem 2 ensures that we can always construct two-level IPP, SFP and FP
codes, with g ≤ q, of size at least half of the size of one-level codes. When
one-level code of exponential size, throwing away half of the codewords would
not effect the codes’ size significantly. However, we do not have the same
result for TA codes. Hence the following question comes up naturally.
Question 1: Let g ≤ q, and let C be a q-ary t-TA code of length `, does
there always exist a q-ary (T, t)-TA code C ′ of length ` of cardinality at least
a half of the original code C, containing g groups?
We believe the answer to this question is yes.
The results in this paper require the number of groups to be small.
Question 2: Are there any good constructions of two-level fingerprinting
codes when the number of groups is greater than the alphabet size?
And the next question follows.
Question 3: Are there any good upper bounds on the size of two-level
codes that are significantly better than the one-level case?
We believe that, in general cases, the bounds will be significantly better
than the one-level case and will begin to depend on T when g grows bigger.
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